The breakdown of a marriage or common-law relationship is rarely a straightforward affair. Beyond the emotional toll, navigating the legal and financial complexities can feel like traversing a minefield. One particularly contentious area often arises in the early stages of separation: spousal support. While parties may have long-term visions for their post-separation lives, the immediate need for financial stability for one spouse can lead to applications for interim spousal support – temporary payments ordered by the court while the larger issues of the separation are being resolved.

A recent decision from the Court of Appeal of Alberta, Stoney v Easton, serves as a crucial reminder for Albertans navigating separation and spousal support. This case underscores the principles guiding the courts when considering interim support, particularly when a prior separation agreement exists.

The Backstory: Separation, Agreement, and a Change of Circumstance

In Stoney, the parties cohabited for three years before marrying in 2010. Their marriage lasted a decade before they separated in August 2020. In December of that same year, they entered into a written separation agreement. A key element of this agreement was Ms. Stoney’s waiver of spousal support, contingent on Mr. Easton assuming all matrimonial debt.

However, circumstances shifted significantly. The couple owned two properties in Fort McMurray. One faced foreclosure, while the other was sold, generating approximately $55,000 in equity. Ms. Stoney alleged that despite an agreement to use this equity to cover the deficit on the foreclosed property, Mr. Easton failed to transfer the funds. This, she claimed, led to collection notices that exacerbated her pre-existing medical conditions, including bipolar disorder. Adding to her difficulties, her disability benefits from a motor vehicle accident ceased, leaving her unable to work and reliant on her elderly mother in Toronto.

With these challenges, Ms. Stoney applied for interim spousal support in early 2024. A central argument in her application was that she had not received independent legal advice before signing the separation agreement and that the agreement was now demonstrably unfair given her significantly altered circumstances.

The Chambers Judge’s Decision: Needs, Means, and a Trial on the Horizon

The chambers judge, tasked with the initial decision on Ms. Stoney’s application, recognized that the existence of the separation agreement was not the final word. Given Ms. Stoney’s challenge to the agreement’s enforceability, the judge determined that this issue required a full trial to resolve.

Applying the factors outlined in section 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act, a cornerstone of Canadian spousal support law, and referencing the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision in Anand v Anand, the chambers judge concluded that interim spousal support was warranted. The judge highlighted the significant length of the relationship, the evident disparity in income between the parties, and Ms. Stoney’s demonstrable need. Consequently, Mr. Easton was ordered to pay $3,000 per month in interim spousal support, commencing October 1, 2024, with the caveat that a trial judge could make adjustments or order repayment if no entitlement to spousal support was ultimately found.

The Appeal: Challenging the Interim Order

Mr. Easton appealed this interim order, raising several key arguments.

The Late-filed Cross-Application and Affidavit were not Considered

Firstly, he contended that the chambers judge erred by refusing to hear his late-filed cross-application and failing to consider his corresponding affidavit. The Court of Appeal swiftly dismissed this, noting that the decision regarding the cross-application was not part of the order under appeal and that the chambers judge had discretion over court scheduling. Furthermore, the Court found no indication that the chambers judge had ignored the relevant parts of Mr. Easton’s affidavit in responding to Ms. Stoney’s support application.

The Legal Test for Interim Spousal Support Was Misapplied

Secondly, Mr. Easton argued that the chambers judge had misapplied the legal test for interim spousal support. The Court of Appeal disagreed, emphasizing that interim orders are distinct from final support orders. They are often made on an incomplete factual record, with a greater focus on the immediate needs and means of the parties. The ultimate question at the interim stage is what is reasonable temporarily while awaiting a full trial. The Court found no error in the chambers judge’s assessment that interim support was reasonable, particularly given Ms. Stoney’s medical challenges and the significant income disparity. The lack of direct causation between her inability to work and the marriage breakdown was not a bar to interim support, as the Divorce Act considers the recipient’s overall “conditions, means and needs,” including the duration of the cohabitation.

Given the Existence of a Separation Agreement, the Miglin Test Ought to Have Been Applied

Thirdly, Mr. Easton asserted that the existence of the separation agreement, with its spousal support waiver, should have led the chambers judge to apply the two-stage test outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada in Miglin v Miglin. This test examines the circumstances surrounding the agreement’s negotiation and its substantive fairness at the time of separation and at the time of the application. Mr. Easton argued that the waiver should have been upheld, thus negating the need for interim support.

However, the Court of Appeal sided with the chambers judge, who had reasonably concluded that a trial was necessary to determine the enforceability of the waiver. Ms. Stoney had presented an arguable case that the waiver was unenforceable, citing the lack of independent legal advice, her vulnerabilities, and the current unfairness of the agreement. The chambers judge’s finding of a “reasonable chance” that the waiver would be set aside at trial was sufficient to justify interim support, particularly in light of Ms. Stoney’s demonstrated need and Mr. Easton’s ability to pay. The Court also highlighted that even if the waiver were ultimately found to be enforceable, section 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act mandates consideration of various factors, with the dependent spouse’s needs and the payor’s ability to pay carrying significant weight in interim applications, as established in Anand.

The Lack of a Specific End Date for the Interim Order and the Absence of a Litigation Plan

Finally, Mr. Easton raised concerns about the lack of a specific end date for the interim support order and the absence of a litigation plan. The Court of Appeal clarified that while the formal order stated “until further order of the court,” the chambers judge had directed that the support continue “until trial.” The Court noted that section 15.2(3) of the Divorce Act allows for interim orders to last until a specified event, such as a trial. While encouraging prompt progression towards a final resolution, the Court found no error in the wording of the order, particularly since Mr. Easton’s counsel had indicated that a trial was likely a year to eighteen months away, and no earlier end date was requested. The Court also noted that no applications for a litigation plan, Early Intervention Case Conference, or referral to special chambers were before the chambers judge. However, the Court echoed the chambers judge’s urging the parties to pursue a case conference under the Alberta Rules of Court to facilitate a litigation plan.

Key Implications for Albertans Facing Separation

The Stoney decision offers several important insights for individuals in Alberta navigating separation and potential spousal support claims:

Separation Agreements are Not Always the Final Word:

While separation agreements are legally binding contracts, their enforceability can be challenged, particularly if there are allegations of unfairness, lack of independent legal advice, or significant changes in circumstances since the agreement was signed.

Interim Support Focuses on Immediate Needs and Means:

When considering interim spousal support, Alberta courts prioritize the immediate financial needs of one spouse and the other spouse’s ability to pay, while the broader issues of entitlement and quantum are often reserved for trial.

Challenging a Waiver Requires Demonstrable Issues:

To successfully argue against a spousal support waiver at the interim stage, the applicant must present a credible argument that the waiver is likely unenforceable, often involving evidence of vulnerability, lack of independent legal advice, or unfairness.

The Court Encourages Efficient Progress to Trial:

While interim support orders provide temporary financial relief, the courts emphasize the importance of actively working towards a final resolution through trial or other dispute resolution methods.

Appealing Interim Orders is Generally Discouraged:

The Court of Appeal in Stoney v Easton reiterated its stance that appealing interim spousal support orders often diverts resources and delays the ultimate resolution of the matter.

Getz Collins and Associates: Experienced Legal Guidance from Knowledgeable Family Lawyers

The case of Stoney v Easton highlights the complexities inherent in family law matters, particularly when dealing with pre-existing agreements and evolving circumstances. If you are facing separation in Alberta and have concerns about spousal support, whether you are seeking it or potentially obligated to pay it, it is crucial to seek experienced legal advice.

The experienced family lawyers at Getz Collins and Associates are dedicated to providing clear, effective, and strategic guidance to clients navigating the intricacies of family law. We can help you understand your rights and obligations, assess the enforceability of existing agreements, and navigate the process of applying for or responding to claims for interim and final spousal support. Contact us today at (587) 391-5600 or visit us online to discuss your situation and ensure you have the knowledgeable representation you need during this challenging time.